CIVIL SECURITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:

A survey of European civil security systems and the role of the EU in building shared crisis management capacities

REPORT BY
Arjen Boin, Raphael Bossong, Vera-Karin Brazova, Federica Di Camillo, Frédéric Coste, Han Dorussen, Magnus Ekengren, Evangelos Fanoulis, Hendrik Hegemann, Timo Hellenberg, Zelimir Kesetovic, Emil Kirchner, Sanneke Kuipers, Alessandro Marrone, Piotr Matczak, Elisande Nexon, Ylva Pettersson, Mark Rhinard, Visnja Samardzija, Dominika Szalankiewicz, Paola Tessari, Alessandro R. Ungaro, Pekka Visuri
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The security challenges that European states face – now and in the future – are daunting. Increased complexity of critical infrastructures, climate change, extraordinary technological innovation, international power shifts, cyber-attacks, energy shortages and environmental degradation create new and unforeseen challenges. In addition, Europe faces ‘conventional’ yet very demanding civil security challenges in response to natural disasters, industrial accidents and terrorist threats.

Traditional approaches and systems for crisis management may become insufficient in the face of these threats. Europe will therefore increasingly need to cooperate with neighbours, regional organisations, civil society, the international community and private sector.

If cooperation is essential, European states need to deepen their understanding and be ready to learn from each other. Different states and regions have diverse legal frameworks, threat perceptions, policy priorities and share different experiences and values. They must understand the structural differences and underlying similarities between national security systems if they are to meet these conflicting ends of deepening international cooperation and respecting local and national diversity.

Exploring the scope for European cooperation in the area of crisis and emergency management has been the core contribution of the ANVIL (Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe) project, which maps the cultural, institutional, legal and operational diversity of 22 national civil security systems and 8 sub-regional organisations in Europe. Such a broad perspective helps to overcome simplistic assumptions about the ‘best way’ to handle crisis, be they purely national, sub-regional or supranational.

Our analysis reveals that administrative responsibilities, legal frameworks and operational practices differ markedly, as the national systems are rooted in national contexts and historical experiences. Intriguingly, we did not discover drastic differences in effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. So while there may be room for improvement in specific areas, there is no single best or ‘one-size-fits all’ model for civil security.

We found that arrangements for cross-border assistance in and outside the EU are generally well developed. The EU may not be a highly visible actor in transboundary civil security, but EU coordination basically enjoys wide support among citizens (though some bigger member states remain hesitant to support further integration leaps).

What does this mean for European cooperation in the face of transboundary crises and disasters? First of all, we argue that societal and civil security, which is embedded in deep local knowledge and public support, cannot be imposed from the top. Our findings suggest a specific role for the European Union as a facilitator and promoter of transboundary cooperation. While standardisation of national structures and processes does not appear helpful or necessary, the EU could play a role in the development of a shared framework used to identify lessons learned and ‘best practices’ in a bottom-up manner.

This paper draws from the work of the EU FP7 – ANVIL project to outline key differences and similarities in national civil security systems in Europe. It takes the ANVIL analysis further by suggesting the EU’s role in enhancing compatibility is best oriented in a few specific directions. Namely, the EU should act as a promoter (illuminating likely cooperation obstacles) and a facilitator (supporting, through resources and as a discussion platform, lesson learning). Academics as well as policymakers should take note. The findings contained herein are relatively rare in so far existing studies of the EU’s growing role in societal security tend to focus on the European level. Taking account of domestic variation fills a gap in current research about European security and safety issues.
INTRODUCTION: NEW CHALLENGES DEMANDING TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION

Civil security systems in Europe have traditionally displayed a wide variation in structures, policies, rules and practices: countries have organized differently in their efforts to protect citizens from threats to their security and safety. Each system evolved in a unique historical and cultural context. Each is bound by different legal/constitutional frameworks. Each system consists of different actors and is governed differently. Each system has different relations with private sector parties. And each system relates to its citizens in unique ways.

Given the variety of major threats faced by countries, diversity in practice and process is to be expected and respected. Experience and research show that the great variety amongst crisis management structures in national systems, processes and practices is not necessarily a bad thing. Analysts agree that there is no ‘one best way’ to approach crisis and disaster management for all types of contingencies.

As the European continent turns its attention to coping with ‘transboundary’ crises – those that jump political, geographical and sectoral boundaries – this diversity in national civil security systems must be better understood to explore avenues for future cooperation. Academics studying the EU’s growing security role are often transfixed on European-level programmes and legislation. We argue that they must incorporate national empirical realities in their analysis, which helps us understand why unified statements of political principle in Brussels are not always, and rarely easily, matched by operational diversity in member states. This gap can be bridged, but it requires increased research, analysis and debate – which we hope to stimulate with this paper. [1]
THE ANVIL PROJECT:
MAPPING CIVIL SECURITY SYSTEMS

This paper draws from the work of the EU FP7 – ANVIL project to outline key differences and similarities in national civil security systems in Europe. The ANVIL project draws together existing data and collects additional information where necessary to map the variety and similarities in Europe’s regional civil security structures, practices and cultures. It investigates if, and to what extent, variety affects the security and safety of Europe’s citizens (for better or worse). The ANVIL project generated 22 case studies of national civil security systems and 8 studies of sub-regional organisations in Europe, and did so according to a common mapping protocol.[2]

We define ‘civil security systems’ as the policies, bodies and mechanisms that a country or region has in place to protect it against new and urgent threats to the security of people and/or the functioning of critical infrastructures. Each government in Europe has such a system in place to provide ‘societal security’ – we may say that this is a core task of the sovereign state. Citizens expect their governments to design and operate capabilities to prevent risks from emerging, to prepare for crises and disasters, to protect values and infrastructures from harm, to respond effectively with sufficient capacity and effective decision-making when a crisis does occur, and to recover swiftly after a crisis strikes.

A crucial question is if and how we can measure the quality – defined in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy – of these civil security systems. In defining quality, we should keep in mind that different systems can be equally effective. What risks a nation should prepare for differ per country or region. In recent years, we have seen forest fires in Southern Europe, industrial accidents in France, a massive earthquake in Italy, flooding in Central and Eastern Europe, terrorist attacks in the UK and Spain, and infrastructure failures in Scandinavia (to name but a few recent events). In response to different crises, and shaped by different administrative traditions, risk cultures and legal constraints, different systems have evolved.

This paper presents the most important findings of the ANVIL case studies[3] and takes the ANVIL analysis further by suggesting the EU’s role in enhancing compatibility is best oriented in a few specific directions. We suggest the EU should focus its efforts in acting as a promoter (illuminating likely cooperation obstacles) and a facilitator (supporting, through resource provision, and providing a discussion platform for lesson learning) rather than a top-down driver (approving binding rules and mandating approaches).
RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. CHANGES UNDERWAY, BUT WITH A STRONG LOCAL FLAVOUR
Since the end of the Cold War and continuing between 2000 and 2012, all systems underwent considerable reform. This is evidenced by the trend towards all-hazards approaches, a clear civilian primacy, some cross-national borrowing in areas like risk and threat assessment and updated functional legislation. However, there are also important differences when it comes to the form, understanding and consequences of transformation.

Reflecting the transformation from military-focused civil defence systems since the end of the Cold War, crisis management is now firmly geared towards dealing with various civilian crises. New concerns have supplemented or even replaced the dominant fear of nuclear war in Europe. Reflecting the recent experience of different types of crises (Figure 1), the civil security systems in most of the countries we studied focus on natural disasters. Industrial/transportation accidents occur regularly but are mostly manageable at the local level. Large-scale and sustained ‘critical infrastructure’ failures are rare and of comparably limited impact to date. Violent events, such as terrorist attacks, are similarly isolated occurrences in a few countries among our sample, even if they attract major political and societal attention. Overall, few analysed countries experienced highly salient ‘signature crises’, which would put an entire national crisis management system to the test. Despite a basic level of shared conceptual understanding, ANVIL confirmed that the definition of crisis is not just a matter of quantitative measures but also depends on a country’s cultural and institutional context, such as the requirements of high level coordination or previous crisis experiences.

In line with these changed threat perceptions and challenges since the end of the Cold War, civilian actors are by now clearly the prime actors in crisis management. In all countries studied by ANVIL, military forces regularly contribute to civil security efforts at the behest of civilian authorities, at least when it comes to exceptional and prolonged crises. The ease, frequency and acceptance of domestic military deployment, however, vary considerably.

Furthermore, the majority of countries tend towards an ‘all-hazards’ rather than a ‘specific threats’ approach, but this is a matter of degree rather than a clear-cut distinction and there is a marked gap between rhetoric and practice (one can thus question the practical relevance of the formally distinct approaches).[5] In fact, it can be argued that all countries have elements of both an all-hazards and a specific threats approach. Many states loosely refer to comprehensive approaches in their overall security strategies and have introduced some form of umbrella laws, but then have various additional strategies and functional legislation for various types of crises. Civil security in this context can be considered a nascent policy field with fuzzy borders and strong interference with other areas. Crisis management commonly relies on a number of cabinet departments and functional agencies, is often taken up by agencies as a temporary function, and many related areas are regulated in various functional laws.

The turn towards all-hazards approaches has been accompanied by the proliferation of risk-based planning and formalised risk and threat assessments. However, integral and advanced risk management has penetrated national systems to very different degrees and in different ways. It is very difficult to assess in how far countries make substantive use of such formal risk assessments and risk-based planning in practice.

2. COMPLEX INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND VARYING DEGREES OF CENTRALIZATION
The case studies reveal very complex institutional arrangements and varying degrees of centralization. Civil security systems usually mirror the regular setup of national governments, but they are often comparatively more decentralised than other policy fields. This becomes particularly apparent in the

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FIGURE 1: TYPES OF CRISSES EXPERIENCED (2000-2012)[4]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crisis</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters and infectious diseases</td>
<td>33% (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial/transportation accidents</td>
<td>23% (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical infrastructure failures</td>
<td>1% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks, other violent international threats</td>
<td>6% (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding errors. Source: ANVIL case studies.
strong operational involvement of local and regional agencies, especially emergency services and fire brigades. Decentralisation, however, is often less marked when it comes to specialised, complex threats, such as epidemics or nuclear disasters, in the formulation of overall civil security policies.

The degree of centralisation varies considerably across countries, reflecting different cultural traditions and institutional arrangements (see Figure 2). North-Western countries prefer decentralised forms of organisation whereas ‘new’ members in Central/Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, especially the Baltic countries and those on the Balkans, feature, on average, more centralised, top-down systems. Yet these differentiations are not absolute and uniform.

The question of centralisation is directly related to arrangements for up- and down-scaling of crisis management responsibilities. Countries differ with regard to the degree of formalisation of such arrangements. In most countries, lower levels of government formally retain the authority to upscale responsibilities and request assistance from higher levels. It appears that the new focus on natural and man-made hazards has challenged the traditional, military-oriented emergency laws with a predilection towards centralised, top-down control. The majority of studied countries have made separate provisions for declaring a ‘state of disaster’ as defined in their country. Four of the 22 studied countries do not have formal legal provisions allowing an emergency declaration (Austria, Croatia, Sweden and Switzerland), while mechanisms for up-scaling follow a comparable bottom-up and civilian-driven logic.

The case studies also reveal very different arrangements regarding the number and structure of implementing agencies for civil security. Typically, operational crisis management during most scenarios is a shared responsibility of several local agencies and emergency responders, most notably fire brigades, emergency medical services, police and voluntary emergency organisations. There is a wide variety of permanent or ad-hoc crisis coordination centres. Even federalist states like Germany and Switzerland have taken some steps to design countrywide crisis coordination centres, even if they cannot exercise direct operational command. Thus, there seems to be a consensus that some level of centralisation is desirable. Yet, nationally specific legal and political setups remain the primary variables that determine the involvement, shape and competences of lead agencies in civil security, particularly at higher levels of government.

Policy formulation usually resides with central governments, except for federal states. However, policymaking on civil security can be a complex exercise involving many different levels, departments and agencies as the issue touches upon many areas and the portfolio of associated actors. In most countries, mayors and/or district commissioners play an important role in local and regional civil crisis management and often lead civil security steering groups or commissions on the regional level.

3. STRONG USE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Formal citizen obligations generally focus on specific contributions during acute emergencies at the request of operational agencies (with potentially more invasive measures during states of emergency or disaster), whereas more regular and general demands for crisis preparation are less common. The observed variation ranges from a few countries that have more extensive binding provisions, such as mandatory civil protection services or obligatory insurances, to cases where citizens’ obligations and responsibilities in civil security are not formally specified (Malta, Netherlands and Serbia).

Voluntary organisations make an important contribution to civil security provision in most ANVIL countries. The degree of organisational coherence and formalisation of cooperation between public agencies and societal actors, however, varies considerably. Especially Central European states with neocorporatist traditions, such as Austria, embrace the formalized inclusion of officially registered organisations with large membership and see this as
one of the core strengths of their systems (Figure 3). Conversely, other countries, like the UK, prefer informal ad-hoc forms of voluntary participation. In some South-Eastern states, namely Romania and Serbia, we find more ambivalent attitudes regarding voluntary engagement going back to volunteerism campaigns during communist rule. These societies apparently tend to have high expectations of the state in the protection of citizens but also remain wary of state institutions and their efforts to incorporate citizens. But also some of the ‘old’ member states with strong formal volunteerism are struggling to preserve high levels of organised voluntary engagement due to social challenges such as demographic change or growing workloads.

Citizens expect governments to ensure a basic degree of protection, but disasters are not among the major concerns of citizens in ANVIL countries. Beyond this relative sense of safety, levels of concern are higher in some countries (especially many ‘new’ members and Italy) while citizens in the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries are least concerned (Figure 4). Many case studies also highlight that concerns about civil emergencies and crises in general remain low in comparison to other national issues for concern, such as economic growth, unemployment or environmental protection.

Communication and education about preparedness and response is mostly passive. Traditional tools like TV/radio warnings and alarm sirens are still dominant, though there is a nascent trend indicating the more frequent use of new technologies and applications. The use of mobile applications for reaching citizens is not very advanced. Moreover, systems for alarming and warning during impending and unfolding crises seem to be more developed than those for outreach and education, which are often limited to the passive distribution of publications or first aid courses for targeted groups. Our findings suggest an overall low level of knowledge among citizens regarding crisis preparedness and response, with an EU average of around 27 per cent according to Eurobarometer data. On the one hand, this indicates a certain lack of public interest and awareness, but it may also be interpreted as a sign of trust or a lack of alarmist attitudes in European societies.

4. LIMITED ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In most ANVIL countries, profit-oriented actors are clearly less involved in civil security and crisis management than voluntary, non-profit organisations. Outsourcing of core tasks in crisis management is not a major trend. Private companies usually play a limited role based on legal safety requirements and special tasks in local emergency management around production facilities or infrastructures. Some smaller, ‘new’ EU member states with weaker capacities seem to be more interested in striking partnerships between governmental agencies and profit-oriented private entities than North-Western European countries. Furthermore, the UK is an outlier in its substantial role given to the private sector. In general, however, evidence suggests that Western and Northern European countries are less inclined to outsource official civil security tasks.

Aside from the persistence of traditional public and non-profit actors in civil security systems, one can discern a nascent trend towards increased

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**FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF OFFICIAL VOLUNTEERS PER 1,000 CAPITA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volunteers per 1,000 Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANVIL case studies [7]

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**FIGURE 4: CITIZEN CONCERN AND TYPES OF THREATS**

Percentage of citizens feeling ‘very concerned’ about natural disasters, man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

Source: Special Eurobarometer 383 [8]
coordination and networking with for-profit actors with regard to ‘new’ security areas, such as critical infrastructure protection and cyber-security. These areas call for the inclusion of specialised knowledge and enhanced outreach to the developers and operators of the central technologies and infrastructures. In various countries, this has translated into a series of public-private-partnerships and common platforms for coordination and information exchange (e.g. Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the UK), supported by related policy and research initiatives of the EU.

5. PERCEIVED AS EFFECTIVE
In assessing effectiveness, the country case studies focused on the outcomes of incident-related political and professional inquiries.

The number of professional and political inquiries varied due to diverse inquiry cultures as well as varying exposures to disasters. For most countries, there is no precise data of the number of professional and political inquiries. While countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden feature a strong professional investigation culture and a high density of evaluations and inquiries, the number of inquiries in most countries is rather low. There are also differences in style and methodology ranging from formalised and mandatory evaluations by external experts to ad hoc political assessments. Generally, most evaluations suggest that stakeholders consider their systems to be rather well prepared for most crises even if they also see some system-specific issues to be further improved as well as distinct deficits in the handling of concrete incidents. The most common shortcomings identified in inquiries refer to problems in coordination, planning and preparation, forecasting and warning, control and overview, and expertise at the local level.

These diverse and intermittent evaluation practices underline the difficulties of providing grounded, accurate and unambiguous assessments of the overall effectiveness of a country’s civil security system. There are no common standards for effectiveness assessment in Europe, which could be expected to command wide acceptance and support. There is no evidence of a strong, systematic relationship between specific operational, cultural or political features of civil security systems (e.g. the degree of centralization or voluntary engagement) and effectiveness measures, as based on available national reports. This generates challenges as well as opportunities for a more intensive EU engagement in comparative assessments and learning processes.

6. EFFICIENCY: DISPERSED AND UNKNOWN COSTS
Assessments of financial cost-benefit efficiency are one of the least developed aspects of national civil security systems. Only a few countries have even begun to collect more systematic data and to use investment review instruments. Overall, one might say that most governments do not have a clear overview of their spending on civil security and crisis management.

This lack of data can be partially explained by the inherent difficulties of measurements. Civil security in many cases is not a coherent political and administrative field but rather a cross-cutting task with fuzzy borders that, depending on the definition, overlaps with several other political and administrative fields, such as public health, water management, transportation or energy. Moreover, decentralisation of crisis management often leads to multi-level financing, with regions and/or municipalities playing an important part in the financing scheme.

As a consequence, there are no clear assessment standards allowing for clear statements regarding the delicate balance between the need to protect societies and prevalent fiscal constraints. Yet, the perception is one of relatively adequate levels of expenditure with regard to potential threats. Efficiency does not often feature as a core concern. In fact, underfunding is more likely to be an issue than excessive spending, even in the relatively secure set of countries studied by ANVIL (see figure 1). International organisations similarly highlight the benefits and need for further investments in effective disaster prevention and response management under conditions of global climate and economic change.

7. SOUND LEGITIMACY
Civil security in the ANVIL countries generally seems to be characterised by a low degree of politicisation and contestation. Electoral results have not been strongly or negatively affected by the management of a crisis during the last decade. We found only a few instances of visible, intense turmoil leading to the resignations of high-profile politicians, incisive court-rulings or popular unrest. In a few cases, national political leaders exploited the state’s performance during an event to generate consensus or to oppose the government. Major legal cases in the area of crisis management are rare and mainly related to financial compensations after disasters in the recovery and reconstruction phases. Despite some widely noted natural disasters, such as L’Aquila earthquake, one could not point to a truly profound crisis of public
legitimacy and trust, as occurred, for instance, after Hurricane Katrina in the US.

Consequently, a majority of citizens appear to have a positive attitude towards civil security and feel generally safe, though levels of support and safety differ somewhat geographically. It seems fair to say that a non-alarmist attitude regarding civil security is dominant in most ANVIL countries. At the same time, there are notable relative differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states when citizens are asked whether their country is doing enough to manage crises (see Figure 5). Overall, there seems to be a basic level of tacit acceptance and support, but it is important to remember that open public debate about fundamental issues, such as the domestic use of the military, remain a democratic necessity.

8. A LIMITED ROLE FOR REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Regional organisations are a regular feature of European governance in many issue areas and in different geographical areas, including in the field of civil security. Our systematic investigation of eight such organisations, primarily in South-Eastern Europe and the Baltic/Barents region, reveals that such organisations are weakly institutionalised, have limited competences in crisis and emergency management (since it is sometimes not part of their respective priorities) and depend on often reluctant member states for financial resources and operational capacities.

Regional organisations are capable of facilitating training and exercises as well as of deepening cross-border ties between national officials, with a special emphasis on prevention and preparedness. Furthermore, regional organisations can enable cross-national, technical cooperation even in areas that are otherwise prone to confrontation. This way, they can play an important symbolic and political function, especially in regions that have experienced major conflicts or are undergoing transformation processes. The civil security work of the studied organisations is generally not well known to the wider public and engagements with private actors are limited. However, some important steps have been taken to reach out to a wider audience, such as public education events e.g. the distribution of a ‘Danube Box’ for crisis preparation and the Danube and Sava days for information, which are considered to be good practice and are beginning to be emulated.

Organisations from one region that share common threats and cultural contexts occasionally cooperate, whereas cross-regional cooperation is rare. Multilateral organizations are not directly involved in regional cooperation efforts either, but they serve as an important source of funding and standards. This especially applies to the EU in the context of Eastern and South-Eastern cooperation, where it exercises a wider structural role for regional cooperation. While member states seem, on the whole, more likely to support further intensification of regional operational projects and information sharing in an intergovernmental format, one can expect that the EU will continue to grow as an umbrella framework for regional organisations in terms of funding and legislation. The regional organisations, in turn, act as transmission belts for decisions reached at EU level and as organized platforms for hosting EU funded projects and conferences. A consistent framework for such interactions between regional organisations and the EU, however, cannot be identified and depends on the specific regional geographical and historical context.

9. DEVELOPED FRAMEWORK FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE, BUT RELUCTANT USE
All ANVIL countries are firmly embedded in multilateral arrangements for civil emergency management. The legal framework for external and cross-border assistance is generally well developed, notwithstanding a handful of exceptions due to exceptional political situations between neighbours. Most of the countries examined in ANVIL have signed formal bilateral agreements on emergency assistance with nearly all of their neighbours. Local cross-border cooperation during everyday emergencies often prospers on the basis of established contacts between ground-level officials and agencies.
During the period 2000-2012, only four ANVIL countries asked for and received assistance during major emergencies more than two times (France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia) whereas six countries received assistance one or two times (Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UK) and twelve countries did not receive any assistance (Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland). There is no evident pattern in requests for assistance. Requests do not systematically correlate with indicators like size, degree of decentralization, regional location or economic capacity. To some degree, it is simply a matter of the actual occurrence of major disasters. However, many states seem to be willing to provide assistance during international assistance missions but remain reluctant to ask for help during domestic crises. Especially the German case study refers to an attitude that stresses the explicit belief that bigger countries should be able to handle large crises alone.

10. NATIONAL CIVIL SECURITY IN THE EU CONTEXT: BASIC ACCEPTANCE, LOW VISIBILITY

In the past years, the EU has steadily built administrative arrangements that can help its member states coordinate their support in joint responses to disasters occurring inside or outside Europe. The EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism has been in place since 2001 and is currently undergoing reform. New initiatives such as the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (the ERCC, which replaced the Monitoring and Information Centre) further strengthen the EU’s role.

Most EU citizens are not aware of EU coordination in civil security. Only in the cases of Malta and Lithuania, the percentage of awareness of EU civil protection actions reaches 50 per cent (or more). The EU is least visible in civil protection in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Sweden. Overall, we see in our sample of countries that the EU is not a very visible actor in delivering civil protection.

Yet, European citizens overwhelmingly believe that joint action is more adequate to deal with civil emergencies than actions by individual states (see Figure 9). When asked, more than 70 per cent feel that EU coordinated action can cope better with civil crises than national endeavours (see Figure 6). In all countries for which we had data available, the number of respondents who have a positive opinion towards EU coordination in civil security is more than 70 per cent, with the Slovaks and the Lithuanians agreeing the most with this statement (86) and the Romanians agreeing the least (75). This wide support contrasts with the reluctance of some of the ‘biggest’ member states regarding a further deepening and centralization of civil security cooperation via the EU.

![Figure 6: Awareness of and Support for EU Coordination](image)

Member states have activated the Civil Protection Mechanism for assistance requests to very different degrees. France has activated the Mechanism five times, Italy four and Hungary two. Yet, 13 of the 20 ANVIL countries participating in the Mechanism never activated it. It is very difficult to distinguish patterns in this activation of the Mechanism. Among the countries that have never activated it are large and small, founding and new, centralised and decentralised members. In general, participant countries in the Civil Protection Mechanism are much more willing to channel assistance through the mechanism than accepting assistance from it through official activations.

All countries of our sample, apart from Serbia and Switzerland, participate in the training activities organised by the Community Mechanism. Small countries tend to participate less in simulation exercises (for example Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, and Malta) which may be due to budget and personnel restraints.
When it comes to financial assistance granted by the EU through the Solidarity Fund (aid aiming at the post-crisis relief of a country), comparatively rich member states in the ANVIL sample also received the largest amount of financial support. France and Italy have applied and received financial aid six times, whereas Romania did so 4 times. The great beneficiaries for the period 2002-2012 have been Italy, Germany, France, the UK, Austria and the Czech Republic (with the amount of funding descending from Italy to the Czech Republic). In sum, one cannot speak of a structural bias or pattern in the use of EU assistance, which could indicate persistent national weaknesses in civil security systems or other incentives for demanding external support. Instead, one may rather surmise that effective EU support is closely aligned with real needs as well as national administrative capacities for request and delivery.

On a political level, governments of some of the bigger states remain sceptical towards further EU cooperation in matters of civil security and disaster management. The UK case study notes that the ‘Euroscepticism’ of British political elites also shapes their perception of the EU’s role in civil security. The actual protection of populations is regarded as a domestic issue directly related to the core of national sovereignty. German officials generally support more informal forms of coordination and exchange but oppose moves to establish operational capacities and command at the EU level. This is due to Germany’s strong esteem for decentralised solutions under the subsidiarity principle. Furthermore, there is also a fear that EU cooperation might become a ‘one-way street’ with Germany having to bear the financial burden for Southern and Eastern member states, despite a lack of clear evidence. French stakeholders support an EU role in risk and threat assessment and best practices but could also envision some sharing of equipment while opposing more substantial harmonisations. These findings seem to mirror the ‘typical’ stances these countries take vis-à-vis the EU.
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

We did not find evidence that relates the diverse national structures and institutions to differences in performance and in the quality of civil security systems. This speaks against a ‘one-size-fits all’ approach on the basis of seemingly evident functional needs of crisis management. Some further observations are worth making as a way to summarise the project and outline steps forward.

- An over-riding and common trend in Europe has been the long-term transformation of civil protection from primarily a military responsibility – as during the Cold War – to a fully civilian-controlled system, even though military capacities are used to varying degrees in support of crisis management in different countries.

- There is a clear tendency towards ‘all-hazards’ civil security systems (or ‘multi-hazards’ in some systems). Crises are increasingly managed by civilian authorities that need to cooperate across functional boundaries to address the evolving nature of contemporary threats. However, depending on the country and issue, certain scenarios remain tied to specific authorities and national crisis response protocols, such as in the case of an epidemic. There is often a gap between rhetoric and practice when it comes to the implementation of comprehensive approaches and strategies.

- Even in unitary states, civil security stands out as a rather decentralised field compared to other policy fields. This is most apparent in the strong role of local fire brigades and emergency services. Decentralisation and bottom-up approaches are most marked in federalist states and – to a lesser extent – the Nordic countries and the Netherlands while many ‘new’ members and candidate countries, especially the Baltic states and those on the Balkans, seem to prefer more centralised, top-down models.

- ANVIL did not find a defined preference for strong central top-down steering and command structures for the purposes of crisis preparedness and response.

- Our research uncovered diversity in terminology for crisis management, emergency response, civil protection etc., which is mostly tied to specific national legal systems and division of competences between governmental levels. A common European language on civil security may thus appear desirable, but is unlikely to reach beyond top-level administrators and managers.

- Countries diverge markedly on the role of NGOs and volunteers in civil security. There seems to be a basic mainstream model of volunteer involvement through voluntary fire brigades and emergency and rescue services at the local level. However, there are very different degrees and forms of voluntary involvement.

- Most states remain hesitant to outsource core tasks in crisis management to private companies. Western and Northern states increasingly establish informal coordination mechanisms with private companies to manage new threats, such as in the area of cyber-security and critical infrastructures.

- Citizens largely trust and support their national civil security system and there is a generally non-alarmist attitude. Civil security tends to be characterised by a rather low level of politicization and contestation. Some South-Eastern European states feature somewhat lower levels of concern and institutional trust.

- All countries under investigation seem to be on a path of modernisation in the area of planning and coordination support systems, such as with regard to the use of websites and communication systems.

- The wide-spread lack of coherent data on spending and planning tools makes it difficult to assess the level of preparedness and redirect resources towards new challenges, which accentuates the generally low level of technological reform outlined above. There is little pressure to improve national civil security systems on the grounds of efficiency.

- While the majority of countries have formal legal provisions for the declaration of a state of emergency and/or disaster, these have not been used to justify unduly wide executive leeway.
Those countries that lack corresponding legal provisions (mostly for historical reasons) do not seem to be less effective or efficient in crisis response situations either.

- There is no generally accepted standard or methodology for effectiveness assessments. Yet, stakeholders seem to be convinced that their systems, as a whole, are working rather well and can handle most crises. Accordingly, it is not possible to set out a single best model in this regard that could do justice to the diverse institutional structures of different European states. If processes of professional inquiries and post-incident reviews could be made more transparent, that might facilitate national and cross-national learning.

- Systems and arrangements for cross-national crisis assistance – be it in EU frameworks, other multilateral forums or on a bi-lateral level – are well developed. With a few exceptions, all countries studied by ANVIL have respective provisions in place and are also regular contributors and/or recipients of such assistance.

NEXT STEPS FOR PRACTICE
Diversity abounds in European civil security systems. Our findings cast doubts on whether standardization driven ‘from above’ is necessary or even desirable. Experience and research in crisis management supports the view that the growing complexity of threats and crises means that system diversity is not necessarily a bad thing – some degree of redundancy and overlap may prove quite useful in crisis situations.

Our research found not just diversity but some degree of commonality. Almost all EU member states have adopted ‘umbrella laws’ on civil security issues, revealing a prioritisation of those issues and appreciation of modern threats that would have been unthinkable just two decades ago. Another commonality is the widespread adoption of an ‘all hazards’ or ‘multi hazards’ approach, albeit only in policy terms rather than organisational or operational terms. The meaning of this term could be usefully defined more carefully, and its implications for constitutional, organisational and operational reforms fleshed out. As the EU moves forward in finding its role in enhancing security through effective cooperation amongst civil security cooperation, a genuine and fine-grained appreciation for both diversity and commonality thus promises to pay dividends not just in cooperation, but also the end-goal: improving the security and safety of the European population.

If European Union officials seek to enhance cooperation, we would suggest that learning ‘from below’ is the way forward to improving compatibilities. The EU’s role might be one of platform or actor; facilitator or driver; promoter or enforcer. In most areas of European integration, the EU is a mix of some or all of those descriptors. In the area of civil security cooperation in the face of transboundary threats, the EU would be best placed as promoter and facilitator of cooperation amongst national officials, taking special care to ensure common political goals adopted in Brussels are reconciled with national diversity. That includes focusing on demonstrable problems, and testing practitioner-validated reforms, through increased analysis and dialogue.

NEXT STEPS FOR RESEARCH
Civil security is a dynamic and increasingly important area, but it is often overlooked by academic social science research. Based on the ANVIL findings and discussions with stakeholders, we can identify a number of questions and issues that should be addressed in future research on European civil security.

A first issue is the relationship between European convergence pressures and the persistence of diverse local traditions and structures. Future projects should investigate whether there are general state legacies and roles of public institutions that cut across the specificities of national security systems and lead to specific regional clusters.

A second question concerns the role and the acceptance of armed forces in domestic emergency management, as well as the military’s possible role in cross-border civil protection activities inside the EU and alongside NATO. The degree to which the military can engage in emergency management is sometimes a legal question while other times a political and normative issue that requires further mapping by researchers. A related issue is the role of private actors in civil security. In view of the importance of voluntary organisations in many European civil security systems and simultaneous challenges to guarantee adequate levels of volunteerism, we need to learn more about innovative forms of social involvement as well as drivers and obstacles to outsourcing in this sector.

Keeping in mind the often confused and contested terminology in civil security, security research should look deeper into the conceptual history of central terms – such as ‘civil protection’ or ‘resilience’, an increasingly popular term – and map their use in
different national contexts. This can range from practical guidelines to academic discourse analyses; whatever the usage, understanding different discourses seems critical to achieving a coordinated approach.

Future research might also focus on examining the exact factors and mechanisms influencing comprehensive integrated risk policies at the national level. As integral risk assessments also raise some normative and political issues, studies could investigate the actual societal and political impact of risk assessments as currently conducted and debate different alternatives models. A related question for national systems is the effect of centralisation and decentralisation on the overall performance capability of civil security systems.

Last but not least, the question of quality and performance remain daunting. ANVIL underlined that one should not strive for universal assessment standards that disregard national traditions and social support structures. Future research might want to explore opportunities and limits for the assessment of civil security systems in a way that takes into account the diversity of views and traditions identified by ANVIL as well as broader political and societal implications. There remains a critical need for knowledge in how to carry out efficiency assessments, including possible standards for data collection, and mutual learning or ‘best practice’ exchanges in civil security systems. This touches on the important question of ‘learning’ – a difficult task at the national level already and one that becomes even more complicated in cross-border settings and in response to demanding crises. Further research into learning enablers and mechanisms of drawing and learning lessons seems warranted and promising.
ENDNOTES

[1] This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 284678.

[2] Interview-based case studies: Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, and the UK. Desk studies: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland. Country reports are available via the ANVIL homepage: www.anvil-project.net.

[3] The more detailed synthesis reports, from which much of the data presented in this paper are drawn, can be found on the ANVIL homepage: www.anvil-project.net.

[4] The ANVIL mapping protocol broadly understood ‘crises’ as serious (materializing) threats to the well-being of citizens and the integrity and functioning of critical infrastructures. The EM-DAT International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be) served as a first empirical basis, but country study writers added and deleted specific crises as far as necessary in order to meet the ANVIL definition of crisis. However, absolute numbers therefore should be read with caution due to potential lacks of data and different national definitions of crisis.

[5] An all-hazards approach assumes that the origins of the threat should not matter for the preparation of the response at the strategic level. A specific-threat approach does assume that it makes a difference whether one prepares for, say, a terrorist attack or the explosion of a chemical plant.

[6] This figure depicts a heuristic grouping based mainly on qualitative assessment, with support of our coding scheme. It should be noted that the coding was too diverse to allow for a ‘hard’ scale.

[7] Approximate estimates according to available sources. Data is available for only 15 of 22 countries.

[8] Not available for Croatia, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland.


[12] Serbia and Switzerland do not participate. Norway participates though it is not an EU member.

[13] All these distributions patterns are to be interpreted with caution due to the relatively small sample and number of trainings.
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